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ABSTRACT
The globalization hazard hypothesis maintains that the current account reversals and asset price
collapses observed during 'Sudden Stops' are caused by global capital market frictions. A policy
implication of this view is that Sudden Stops can be prevented by offering global investors price
guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees, however, introduce a moral hazard
incentive  for  global  investors,  thus  creating  a  tradeoff  by  which  price  guarantees  weaken
globalization hazard but strengthen international moral hazard. This paper studies the quantitative
implications of this tradeoff using a dynamic stochastic equilibrium asset-pricing model. Without
guarantees, distortions induced by margin calls and trading costs cause Sudden Stops driven by
Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism. Price guarantees prevent this deflation by introducing a distortion
that props up foreign demand for assets. Non-state-contingent guarantees contain Sudden Stops but
they are executed often and induce persistent asset overvaluation. Guarantees offered only in high-
debt states are executed rarely and prevent Sudden Stops without persistent asset overvaluation. If
the elasticity of foreign asset demand is low, price guarantees can still contain Sudden Stops but
domestic agents obtain smaller welfare gains at Sudden Stop states and suffer welfare losses on
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1.   Introduction 
The Sudden Stop phenomenon of emerging markets crises is characterized by three 
stylized facts: a sudden reversal of private capital inflows and current account deficits, a collapse 
in production and private absorption, and large relative price corrections in domestic goods 
prices and asset prices. A large fraction of the literature on this subject is based on a hypothesis 
that Calvo (2002) labeled “globalization hazard.” According to this hypothesis, world capital 
markets are inherently imperfect, and hence prone to display contagion and overreaction in the 
determination of asset positions and prices relative to levels consistent with “fundamentals” (see 
Arellano and Mendoza (2003) for a short survey of this literature). This argument suggests that 
an international financial organization (IFO) could help prevent Sudden Stops by offering global 
investors ex-ante price guarantees on the emerging-markets asset class. Calvo put forward a 
formal proposal for setting up this facility and compared it with other arrangements that 
propose ex-post price guarantees for global investors (including the IMF’s Contingent Credit 
Line and the proposal put forward by Lerrick and Meltzer (2003)).    
Ex-ante price guarantees aim to create an environment in which asset prices can be 
credibly expected to remain above the crash levels that trigger Sudden Stops driven by 
globalization hazard. Calvo views this facility as kin to an open-markets operation facility: it 
would exchange a liquid, riskless asset (e.g., U.S. T-bills) for an index of emerging markets 
assets whenever the value of the index falls by a certain amount, and would re-purchase the 
riskless asset when the index recovers. The optimal response of market participants would 
incorporate their expectations that these guarantees would be executed if a systemic fire sale 
were to make asset prices crash, and hence the price guarantees could rule out rational 
expectations equilibria in which Sudden Stops occur. If globalization hazard is the only cause of 
Sudden Stops, and if the support of the probability distribution of the shocks that can cause 
them is known (i.e., if there are no truly “unexpected” shocks), the facility would rarely trade. 
A potentially important drawback of ex-ante price guarantees is that they introduce 
moral hazard incentives for global investors. Everything else the same, the introduction of the 
guarantees increases the foreign investors’ demand for emerging markets assets, since the 
downside risk of holding these assets is transferred to the IFO providing the guarantees. This 
can be a serious drawback because a similar international moral hazard argument has been 
forcefully put forward as a competing explanation of Sudden Stops, and has been used to 
propose major reforms to the international financial system (see the Meltzer Commission report 
and the article by Lerrick and Meltzer (2003)).
1   
Proponents of the international moral hazard view argue that Sudden Stops are induced 
by excessive indebtedness of emerging economies driven by the expectation of global investors 
that IFOs will bail out countries in financial difficulties. Based on this premise, Lerrick and 
                                          
1 Part of the literature on Sudden Stops focuses on domestic moral hazard problems caused by 
government guarantees offered to domestic agents (see, for example, Krugman (2000)). This paper focuses 
instead on Sudden Stops triggered by globalization hazard, and on the tradeoff between this hazard and 
the international moral hazard created by offering price guarantees to global investors.   2
Meltzer (2003) proposed the use of ex-post price guarantees to be offered by an IFO to anchor 
the orderly resolution of a default once it has been announced and agreed to with the IFO. The 
IFO would determine the crash price of the defaulted asset and would require the country to 
commit to re-purchase the asset at its crash price (making the commitment credible by having 
the IFO commit itself to buy the asset at a negligible discount below the crash price if the 
country were unable to buy it). If the only cause of Sudden Stops is international moral hazard, 
the announcement of this arrangement should remove the moral hazard distortion and reduce 
debt levels, and in practice the arrangement itself would rarely be activated. 
The tensions between the globalization hazard and moral hazard hypotheses, and their 
alternative proposals for using price guarantees, reflect an important tradeoff that ex-ante price 
guarantees create. On one hand, ex-ante price guarantees could endow IFOs with an effective 
tool to prevent and manage Sudden Stops driven by frictions affecting international capital 
markets. On the other hand, ex-ante guarantees could end up making matters worse by 
strengthening international moral hazard incentives (even if it were true that globalization 
hazard was the only cause of Sudden Stops in the past).    
The globalization hazard-moral hazard tradeoff implies that making the case for ex-ante 
price guarantees requires their advocates to show that it is possible to design a system of price 
guarantees such that its benefits, in terms of undoing the distortions induced by financial 
frictions, outweighs its costs, in terms of inducing moral hazard. The goal of this paper is to 
study this issue from the perspective of the quantitative predictions of a dynamic, stochastic 
general equilibrium model of asset pricing and current account dynamics. The model is based on 
the globalization hazard setup of Mendoza and Smith (2004). This paper adds to their 
framework an IFO that offers ex-ante guarantees to foreign investors on the asset prices of an 
emerging economy. We are interested in particular in studying how the guarantees affect asset 
positions, asset price volatility, business cycle dynamics, and the magnitude of Sudden Stops. 
Asset price guarantees have not received much attention in quantitative equilibrium 
asset pricing theory, with the notable exception of the work by Ljungqvist (2000), and these 
guarantees have yet to be introduced into the research program dealing with quantitative 
models of Sudden Stops. The theoretical literature and several policy documents on Sudden 
Stops have examined various aspects of the globalization hazard and international moral hazard 
hypotheses separately. From this perspective, one contribution of this paper is that it studies 
the interaction between these two hypotheses in a unified dynamic equilibrium framework from 
which we derive quantitative predictions. 
The two financial frictions that we borrowed from Mendoza and Smith (2004) to 
construct a model in which globalization hazard causes Sudden Stops are: (a) a margin 
constraint on foreign borrowing faced by the agents of an emerging economy, and (b) asset 
trading costs incurred by foreign securities firms specialized in trading the equity of the 
emerging economy.
2 These frictions are intended to represent the collateral constraints and 
                                          
2 Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) first proposed a closed economy asset-pricing model with these features.   3
informational frictions that have been widely studied in the Sudden Stops literature (see, for 
example, Calvo (1998), Izquierdo (2000), Calvo and Mendoza (2000a, 2000b), Caballero and 
Krishnamurty (2001), Mendoza (2004), Paasche (2001) and Schneider and Tornell (1999)). 
The model introduces asset price guarantees in the form of ex-ante guarantees offered to 
foreign investors on the liquidation price (or equivalently, on the return) of the emerging 
economy’s assets. Thus, these guarantees are kin to a “put option” with minimum return. An 
IFO offers these guarantees and finances them with a lump-sum tax on foreign investors’ profits. 
Both domestic agents and foreign investors are aware of the IFO’s guarantees policy when 
formulating their optimal plans. Hence, forward-looking equity prices reflect the effects of 
margin constraints, trading costs and ex-ante price guarantees. The setup of the price 
guarantees is similar to the one proposed in Ljungqvist’s (2000) closed-economy, representative-
agent analysis, but framed in the context of what is effectively a two-agent equilibrium asset-
pricing model with margin constraints and trading costs. 
Price guarantees have different implications depending on the level at which they are set. 
If they are set so low that they are never executed, globalization hazard dominates and the 
model yields the same Sudden Stop outcomes of the Mendoza-Smith model. If they are set so 
high that they are always executed, the model yields equilibria highly distorted by international 
moral hazard. Hence, the interesting range for studying the globalization hazard-moral hazard 
tradeoff lies between these two extremes. The quantitative analysis shows that guarantees set 
slightly above the model’s “fundamentals” price (by ½ to 1 percent) contain the Sudden Stop 
effects of globalization hazard and virtually eliminate the probability of margin calls in the 
stochastic steady state. If the guarantee is non-state-contingent, the guarantee is executed often 
(with a long-run probability of about 1/3) and the model predicts persistent overvaluation of 
asset prices above the prices obtained in a frictionless environment. A guaranteed price set at 
the same level but offered only at high levels of external debt is executed much less often (with 
a long run probability below 1/100) and it is equally effective at containing Sudden Stops 
without inducing persistent asset overvaluation.  
Analysis of the normative implications of the model shows that, when the elasticity of 
foreign demand for domestic assets is high, the guarantees improve domestic welfare measured 
from initial conditions at a Sudden Stop state, with negligible changes in long-run welfare levels. 
At the same time, the value of foreign traders’ firms measured in a Sudden Stop state falls 
slightly, while their long-run average rises sharply. In this case the balance tilts in favor of using 
price guarantees to contain globalization hazard. On the other hand, when the elasticity of 
foreign demand for domestic assets is low, higher price guarantees are needed to prevent Sudden 
Stops, and as a result large moral hazard distortions reduce domestic welfare gains at Sudden 
Stop states and enlarge average welfare losses in the stochastic steady state. In this case, price 
guarantees can be a misleading policy instrument that yields a short-term improvement in 
macroeconomic indicators and welfare at the expense of a long-term welfare loss.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and characterizes the 
competitive equilibrium in the presence of margin constraints, trading costs and ex-ante price   4
guarantees. Section 3 studies key properties of this equilibrium that illustrate the nature of the 
globalization hazard-moral hazard tradeoff. Section 4 represents the competitive equilibrium as a 
recursive, rational expectations equilibrium and proposes a solution algorithm. Section 5 
conducts the quantitative analysis and Section 6 concludes. 
2.    A Model of Globalization Hazard and Price Guarantees 
Consider a small open economy (SOE) inhabited by a representative household that 
rents out labor and a time-invariant stock of capital to a representative firm. Households can 
trade the equity of this firm with a representative foreign securities firm specialized in trading 
the economy’s equity, and can also access a global credit market of one-period bonds. In 
addition, an IFO operates a facility that guarantees a minimum sale price to foreign traders on 
their sales of the emerging economy’s equity. Dividend payments on the emerging economy’s 
equity are stochastic and vary in response to exogenous productivity shocks. Markets of 
contingent claims are incomplete because trading equity and bonds does not allow domestic 
households to fully hedge domestic income uncertainty, and the credit market is imperfect 
because of margin constraints and trading costs. 
2.1    The Emerging Economy 
The representative firm inside the SOE produces a tradable commodity by combining 
labor (n) and a time-invariant stock of physical capital (k) using a Cobb-Douglas technology: 
exp(εt)F(k,n), where ε is a Markov productivity shock. This firm participates in competitive 
factor and goods markets taking the real wage (w) as given. Thus, the choice of labor input 
consistent with profit maximization yields standard marginal productivity conditions for labor 
demand and the rate of dividend payments (d ): 





   (2)  exp( ) ( , ) tt k dF ε =
The representative household chooses intertemporal sequences of consumption (c), labor 
supply (n), equity holdings (α), and foreign bond holdings (b) so as to maximize Epstein’s 
(1983) stationary cardinal utility (SCU) function: 
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This utility function is a time-recursive, Von Neumann-Morgenstern intertemporal utility index 
with an endogenous rate of time preference. The period utility function u(⋅) is a standard, 
concave, twice-continuously differentiable utility function. The function v(⋅) is the time 
preference function, which is also concave and twice-continuously differentiable. The argument 
of both functions is a composite good defined by consumption minus the disutility of labor c-
h(n), where h(⋅) is an increasing, convex, continuously-differentiable function. Greenwood, 
Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) introduced this composite good as a way to eliminate the wealth 
effect on labor supply. As in Mendoza and Smith (2004), this property of preferences, together 
with conditions (1) and (2), separates the determination of equilibrium wages, dividends, labor 
and output from the equilibrium allocations of consumption, saving and portfolio choice.    5
The endogenous rate of time preference of the SCU function introduces an “impatience 
effect” on the marginal utility of date-t consumption by which changes in ct alter the subjective 
discount rate applied to future utility flows. Epstein showed that the conditions required for 
SCU to be consistent with consumption smoothing limit this impatience effect. Utility functions 
with endogenous impatience are commonly used in models of small open economies to obtain 
well-defined long-run equilibria for holdings of foreign assets in which the exogenous world 
interest rate equals the rate of time preference (see for example Obstfeld (1981) or Mendoza 
(1991)).
3 As Section 3 shows, in models with financial frictions these preferences are also critical 
for supporting long-run equilibria in which credit constraints bind.  
The household maximizes lifetime utility subject to the following budget constraint: 
   (4)  11 () tt tt t t t t t t ck d w n q k bb αα α ++ =+ + −− + R
1
                                        
where αt and αt+1 are beginning- and end-of-period shares of capital owned by households, qt is 
the price of equity, and R is the world real interest rate (which is kept constant for simplicity).   
International loan contracts incorporate a collateral constraint in the form of a margin 
clause by which the stock of foreign debt of the small open economy cannot exceed the fraction 
κ of the market value of the SOE’s equity holdings: 
   (5)  11 ,0 tt t bq k κα κ ++ ≥− ≤ ≤
Margin clauses of this form are widely used in international capital markets. In some 
instances they are imposed by regulators with the aim of limiting the exposure of financial 
intermediaries to idiosyncratic risk in lending portfolios, but they are also widely used by 
investment banks and other lenders as a mechanism to manage default risk (they can take the 
form of explicit margin clauses linked to the value of specific securities offered as collateral, or 
implicit margin requirements linked to the volatility of returns of an asset class or subclass as 
those implied by value-at-risk collateralization). Margin clauses are a particularly effective 
collateral constraint (compared to constraints like the well-known Kiyotaki-Moore constraint 
that limits debt to the discounted liquidation value of assets one period ahead) because: (a) 
custody of the securities that constitute the collateral is surrendered at the time the credit 
contract is entered and (b) margin calls to make up for shortfalls in the market value of the 
collateral are automatic once the value of the securities falls below the contracted value.   
Households in the small open economy also face a short-selling constraint in the equity 
market: αt+1 ≥χ with -∞<χ<1 for all t. This constraint is necessary in order to make the 
margin constraint non-trivial. Otherwise, any borrowing limit in the bond market implied by a 
binding margin constraint could always be undone by taking a sufficiently short equity position. 
2.2    The Foreign Securities Firm, the IFO & the Price Guarantees 
  The representative foreign securities firm obtains funds from international investors and 
specializes in investing them in the SOE’s equity. The securities firm maximizes its net present 
value discounted at the stochastic discount factor relevant for its international clients (i.e., the 
 
3Arellano and Mendoza (2003) provide further details and a short survey of the literature on this issue.   6
world interest rate). Thus, the foreign traders’ problem is to choose a sequence of equity 
holdings αt+1
*, for t , so as to maximize:  1,..., = ∞
  () () () 0
0
2 ** * * *




tt t t t t t t t t t t t DE
a





  ≡−− − − + −      ∑  * . T  (6) 
The total net return of the foreign securities firm (πt) is the sum of: (a) dividend 
earnings on current equity holdings (kαt
*dt ), minus (b) the value of equity trades, which is the 
difference between equity purchases qt k α t+1
* minus equity sales max(qt,q )kα  t  t
* executed at 
either the market price qt or the guaranteed price q , whichever is greater, minus (c) trading 




*) and a recurrent 
trading cost (θ ), minus (d) lump sum taxes paid to the IFO (kTt
*). Trading costs are specified 
in quadratic form, as in some of the literature on equilibrium asset pricing models with trading 
costs, so a is a standard adjustment-cost coefficient. 
The IFO buys equity from the foreign traders at the guaranteed price and sells it at the 
equilibrium price. Thus, the IFO’s budget constraint is: 
  () ( )
* max 0, tt Tq q α = −  *
t t  (7) 
If the guarantee is not executed, the tax is zero.  If the guarantee is executed, the IFO sets the 
lump-sum tax to match the value of the executed guarantee (i.e., the extra income that foreign 
traders earn by selling equity to the IFO instead of selling it in the equity market).  Since the 
return on equity is Rt
q ≡ [dt+qt ]/ qt-1, the IFO’s offer to guarantee the date-t price implies a 
guaranteed return on the emerging economy’s equity .   [] 1 /
q
tt t t Rq d q − =+  
2.3   Equilibrium 
A competitive equilibrium is given by stochastic sequences of prices [ ] 0 ,, ttt t wdq
∞
=  and 
allocations  such that: (a) households maximize the utility function (3) 
subject to the constraints (4) and (5) and the short-selling constraint, taking prices, wages and 
dividends as given, (b) domestic firms maximize profits so that equations (1) and (2) hold, 
taking wages and dividends as given, (c) foreign traders maximize (6) taking the price of equity, 
the price guarantees and lump-sum taxes as given, (d) the budget constraint of the IFO in 
equation (7), holds and (e) the equity market clears (i.e., α 
**










*=1 for all t). 
3.    Characterizing the Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff 
The tradeoff between the globalization hazard introduced by the distortions that margin 
constraints and trading costs create and the moral hazard introduced by distortions due to price 
guarantees can be illustrated with the optimality conditions of the competitive equilibrium. 
Consider the first-order conditions of the domestic household’s maximization problem: 
   (8)  (, )
t C Uc n λ =
   (9)  () t hn w ′ =
  ( ) [ ] 11 1 () tt t tt t t qE d q λη κ λ υ ++ + − =+ t +  (10) 
  [ ] 1 tt t t E λη λ + − = R  (11) 
(, )
t c Uc n is the derivative of the SCU function with respect to ct (which includes the impatience 
effect), and λt, ηt and υt are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint, the margin 
constraint, and the short-selling constraint respectively.   7
Condition (8) has the standard interpretation: at equilibrium, the marginal utility of 
wealth equals the lifetime marginal utility of consumption. Condition (9) equates the marginal 
disutility of labor with the real wage. This is the case because the Greenwood-Hercowitz-
Huffman composite good implies that the marginal rate of substitution between ct and nt is 
equal to the marginal disutility of labor h′(nt ), and thus is independent of ct. It follows from this 
result that condition (9) together with (1) and (2) determine the equilibrium values of nt, wt and 
dt as well as the equilibrium level of output. These “supply-side” solutions are independent of 
the dynamics of consumption, saving, portfolio choices and equity prices, and are therefore also 
independent of the distortions induced by financial frictions and price guarantees.   
The neutrality of the “supply side” of the domestic economy with respect to the financial 
frictions follows from admittedly strong assumptions but it simplifies significantly the solution of 
the model by separating the equilibrium path of dividends from the saving and portfolio 
decisions. Mendoza (2004) studies the business cycle implications of margin constraints in a 
small-open-economy model with endogenous investment in which financial frictions affect 
dividends, investment and the Tobin Q, but abstracting from international equity trading. 
Conditions (10) and (11) are Euler equations for the accumulation of equity and bonds 
respectively. As in Mendoza and Smith (2004), these conditions can be combined to derive 
expressions for the forward solution of equity prices and the excess return on equity from the 
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where Mt+1+i ≡ λt+1+i /λt , for i=0,...,∞, is the marginal rate of substitution between ct+1+i and ct. 
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Expressions (12)-(14) show the direct and indirect effects of margin calls on the demand 
for equity of domestic agents, and thus on their valuation of equity and excess returns. The 
direct effect of a date-t margin call is represented by the term ηt (1-κ) in (13), or the term ηtκ in 
(12): When a margin call occurs, domestic agents “fire sale” equity in order to meet the call and 
satisfy the borrowing constraint. Everything else the same, this effect lowers the date-t equity 
price and increases the expected excess return for t+1. The indirect effect of the margin call is 
reflected in the fact that a binding borrowing limit makes “more negative” the co-variance 
between the marginal utility of consumption and the rate of return on equity (since a binding 
borrowing limit hampers the households’ ability to smooth consumption). These direct and 
indirect effects increase the rate at which future dividends are discounted in the domestic 
agents’ valuation of asset prices, and thus reduce their demand for equity. Interestingly, the   8
date-t equity price along the domestic agents’ demand curve is reduced by a margin constraint 
that is binding at date t or by any expected binding margin constraint in the future. As a result, 
equity prices and the domestic demand for equity can be distorted by the margin requirements 
even in periods in which the constraint does not bind. 
In a world with frictionless asset markets, domestic agents facing margin calls could sell 
assets in a perfectly-competitive market in which the world demand for the emerging economy’s 
assets is infinitely elastic at the level of the fundamentals price. Margin calls would trigger 
portfolio reallocation effects without any price movements. However, in the presence of frictions 
that make the world demand for the emerging economy’s assets less than infinitely elastic, the 
equilibrium asset price falls. Since households were already facing margin calls at the initial 
price, this price decline tightens further the margin constraint triggering a new round of margin 
calls. This downward spiral in equity prices is a variant of Fisher’s debt-deflation mechanism, 
which magnifies the direct and indirect effects of the margin constraint. 
The world demand for assets of the emerging economy is less than infinitely elastic 
because of the trading costs that foreign traders incur. Define the conditional expected value of 
the stream of dividends discounted at the world interest rate as the “fundamentals” price 
. The first-order condition for the optimization problem of foreign 








































  (15) 
The foreign traders’ demand for the emerging economy’s assets is an increasing function of: (a) 
the percent deviation of qt 
f relative to qt (with an elasticity equal to 1/a) and (b) the expected 
present discounted value of the “excess prices” induced by the price guarantees in percent of 
today’s equity price. The first effect reflects the influence of the per-trade trading costs. If a =0 
and there are no price guarantees, the foreign traders’ demand function is infinitely elastic at q 
f. 
The second effect is the international moral hazard effect of the guarantees, which acts as a 
demand shifter on the foreign traders’ demand function. Foreign traders that expect price 
guarantees to be executed at any time in the future have a higher demand for domestic assets at 
date t than they would in a market without guarantees. The recurrent trading costs are also a 
demand shifter (the foreign traders’ demand function is lower the higher is θ ). 
  Putting together the previous results, the tradeoff between globalization hazard and 
international moral hazard can be summarized as follows. Suppose the date-t asset price in a 
market without margin constraints and without price guarantees is determined at the 
intersection of the domestic agents’ and foreign traders’ demand curves (HH and FF 
respectively) at point A in Figure 1. 
The demand function of foreign traders is simply equation (15), shown in Figure 1 as a 
linear function for simplicity and as an upward-slopping curve because the horizontal axis   9
measures α, which is the complement of α*. This FF curve is relatively flat to approximate a 
situation with low per-trade costs. There is no closed-form solution for HH, so the curve 
depicted is intended only to facilitate intuition. HH is shown as an downward-slopping curve 
but, since domestic agents respond to wealth, intertemporal-substitution and portfolio-
composition effects in choosing their equity holdings, HH can be downward or upward slopping 


















Suppose that a margin call hits domestic agents because an adverse shock hits the 
economy when their debt is sufficiently high relative to the value of their assets. As a result, HH 
shifts to HH ′. In Figure 1, HH ′ represents the “final” demand function, including the 
magnification effect of the Fisherian debt-deflation mechanism. Without price guarantees, the 
date-t equilibrium price would fall to point B. This is the “Sudden Stop scenario,” in which 
margin calls result in lower asset prices and reversals in consumption and the current account. 
Enter now an IFO that sets a price guarantee higher than the market price at B. The 
international moral hazard effect shifts the foreign traders’ demand curve to FF′ and the new 
date-t market price is determined at point C, which yields the fundamentals price. The scenario 
depicted here is an ideal one in which the IFO is assumed to know exactly at what level to set 
the guaranteed price so as to stabilize the market price at the fundamentals level. If the 
guarantee is “too low” (i.e., below the price at B) it would have no effect on the Sudden Stop 
equilibrium price, and thus price guarantees would be irrelevant. If the guarantee is “too high” 
it could lead to a price higher than the fundamentals price with the “overpricing” even larger 
than the “underpricing” that occurs at B. Hence, ex-ante price guarantees do not necessarily 
reduce the volatility of asset prices (as the numerical analysis of Ljungqvist (2000) showed).      10
In Figure 1, the equilibrium with margin constraints, trading costs and price guarantees 
at C is one in which foreign traders own more equity than in the absence of price guarantees at 
B. This can still allow domestic agents to support higher debt in the bond market, as long as 
the value of their equity increases (i.e., as long as the increase in qt offsets the reduction in αt+1).  
If the HH and HH ′ curves were upward sloping, the moral hazard effect would still prop 
up the foreign traders’ asset demand function, but in the equilibrium with price guarantees, 
domestic agents would end up owning more equity relative to the equilibrium without price 
guarantees. In this case, this higher level of domestic equity holdings also means that the 
domestic economy’s debt would be higher than in the absence of the guarantees when the 
margin constraint binds. Thus, the model can predict that price guarantees offered to foreign 
traders lead to excessive holdings of equity and excessive borrowing by domestic agents. 
From the perspective of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, Figure 1 is a 
partial equilibrium snapshot of the date-t asset market. The forward-looking behavior of 
domestic households and foreign traders implies that changes that affect the date-t asset market 
spillover into the market outcomes at other dates and vice versa. For example, the price 
guarantee may not be in force at t but the expectation of executing future price guarantees will 
shift upward the FF curve at t. Similarly, the margin constraint may not bind at t, but the 
expectation of future margin calls is enough to shift the date-t HH curve. Given the lack of 
closed-form solutions for equilibrium allocations and prices, the only way to study the effects of 
price guarantees on the dynamics of consumption, the current account, asset holdings, and asset 
prices is by exploring the model’s quantitative implications via numerical simulation. 
4.   Recursive Equilibrium and Solution Method 
In the recursive representation of the equilibrium, the state variables are the current 
holdings of assets and bonds in the emerging economy, α and b, and the realizations of 
productivity shocks ε. The state space of asset positions spans the discrete grid of NA nodes 
Α={α1<α2<…<αNA} with α1=χ, and the state space of bonds spans the discrete grid of NB 
nodes Β={b1<b2<…<bNB}. The endogenous state space is defined by the discrete set Z  
of NA×NB elements. Productivity shocks follow a stationary, two-point Markov chain with 
realizations E={ε
= Α×Β
 L < ε H}. Equilibrium wages, dividends, labor and output are determined by 
solving the supply-side system given by equations (1), (2), (9) and the production function. The 
solutions are given by functions that depend only on ε : w(ε), d(ε), n(ε) and F(ε). 
Assume that foreign traders and domestic agents take as given a continuous, 
nonnegative asset pricing functionqb . For a given pair of conjectured decision 
rules for assets and bonds,  , the conjectured pricing function must 
satisfy qb , where: 
ˆ(,,) : EZ R αε + × →
ˆ ,) ,(,,) : bbb E Z ε α ε ′′ × →
(,,) b αε
ˆ (, αα
max ) bq ≤≤
R
)
min ˆ (,,) (,, q αε αε
  ( [ ] min(,,) () (,,) 1 f q bqG b a αε ε αε αχ θ   =+ + − +    (16) 
  () [ ] max(,,) () (,,) 1 f
NA qbqG b a αε ε αε αα θ   =+ + − +    (17) 
and G(α,b,ε) represents the expected present discounted value of “excess prices” induced by the 
price guarantees and the conjectured pricing function and decision rules. The prices in (16) and   11
(17) are maximum and minimum prices along the foreign traders’ demand curve. These bounds 
of the pricing function follow from the fact that when domestic agents hit either χ or αNA, the 
foreign traders are at the “short side” of the market.   
The recursive equilibrium can be characterized in one of the two ways described in 
Mendoza and Smith (2004), modified to include the effect of the price guarantees. One approach 
iterates on the asset pricing function “outside” the optimization problem of the SOE. This 
approach uses the conjectured pricing function, the foreign trader’s demand function and the 
market-clearing condition in the asset market to create a conjectured law of motion for equity 
holdings, and solves a dynamic programming problem for the SOE in which bond holdings are 
the only endogenous state given this law of motion and the conjectured pricing function. This 
dynamic programming problem yields optimal consumption plans and these plans are then used 
to compute an “actual” pricing function.  The “actual” and conjectured pricing functions are 
used to create a new conjectured pricing function with a Gauss-Siedel rule, and the process is 
repeated until the conjectured and actual pricing functions satisfy a convergence criterion. 
The drawback of this method is that convergence of pricing function iterations is not 
achieved via a contraction mapping property like that of the Bellman equation. Instead, pricing 
function iterations seek “stable convergence” of excess supply or demand to market-clearing 
prices in all points of the state space starting from an arbitrary initial pricing function. This 
creates two problems. First, convergence is slow because Gauss-Siedel updates of price 
conjectures need to use adaptive successive overrelaxation to prevent price iterations from 
producing the classic problem of unstable “hog” cycles (by which price iterations diverge away 
from market-clearing prices instead of converging to them). As a result, solutions based on this 
method can take several hours to compute. Second, the final pricing function generally retains 
higher margins of error than those produced by value function iterations.  
The second method represents the equilibrium of the model in recursive form using a 
“quasi-planning problem” in which the contraction-mapping property of the Bellman equation is 
exploited to compute equilibrium prices faster and without error. The quasi-planning-problem 
approach starts with a conjecture for the expected present value of “excess prices”Gb. 
Given this conjecture, the optimal plans of domestic agents are represented as the solution to 
the following dynamic programming problem: 
ˆ(,,) αε
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { }
,
(,,) m a x () e x p () ,,
b
V b uc hn vc hn EV b
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k α ′  (20) 
In this formulation, domestic agents choose equity and bond positions and equity prices are 
displaced with the prices along the demand curve of foreign traders by imposing market clearing 
in the equity market and solving for the equity prices implied by equation (15).     12
Once the above dynamic programming problem is solved, the resulting optimal plans for 
equity holdings are plugged into equation (15) to derive the “actual” asset pricing function for 
the given conjectureGb. The decision rules for bonds and equity, the guaranteed prices, 
and this “actual” pricing function are then used to solve for the “actual” Gbfunction (i.e., 
the function that returns the expected present discounted value of excess prices conditional on 
any initial triple (α,b,ε)). The conjectured and actual G functions are then combined to create a 
new conjecture using a standard Gauss-Siedel rule and the procedure starts again with the 
Bellman equation (18). The process is repeated until the actual and conjectured G functions 
converge, so that the functionGbthat is taken as given in the dynamic programming 
problem is consistent with the function Gbimplied by the asset pricing function and 





The drawback of this quasi-planning-problem method is that in principle it treats the 
emerging economy as a Stackelberg leader that internalizes the demand function of foreign 
traders. Mendoza and Smith (2004) show, however, that the only deviation from the competitive 
equilibrium conditions introduced by this Stackelberg-leader feature reduces to a distortion that 
appears as a multiple of the return on equity in the marginal benefit of equity purchases by 
domestic agents. Thus, the equilibrium of this quasi-planning problem is equivalent to a 
competitive equilibrium for a variant of the model with a proportional tax or subsidy on asset 
returns, with tax revenues rebated as a lump-sum transfer. Mendoza and Smith show that 
whether the distortion is a tax or a subsidy depends on how much date-t and date-t+1 equity 
prices vary with the optimal choice of αt+1 along the foreign traders’ demand curve, which in 
turn depends on the size of a (i.e., on the price elasticity of this demand function).  
We face therefore a choice between a method that solves the competitive equilibrium 
with error in the asset pricing function and a method that computes prices without error but 
does so by introducing a tax-like distortion on equity returns earned by domestic agents. In the 
simulations of the next Section we use a baseline value of a =0.2 and consider also a =2 as part 
of a sensitivity analysis. The maximum absolute values of the distortion produced by the quasi-
planning problem method are equivalent to negligible taxes on asset returns that range between 
0.08 (0.4) and 0.2 (0.8) percent when a =0.2 (2). The average distortion in absolute value is 
about 0.03 (0.3) percent in all the simulations with a =0.2 (2). Since this method is also 
considerably faster, we chose to use it instead of the pricing iteration method. 
The optimal decision rules obtained after the solution method converges constitute a 
recursive, rational expectations equilibrium. At this equilibrium, the decision rules determining 
asset holdings, bond holdings, consumption, labor, wages, dividends, the foreign traders’ asset 
holdings and asset prices are such that: (a) given wages, dividends and asset prices, the policy 
functions for c, b′, α′ and n maximize household utility and firm profits in the SOE subject to 
the relevant constraints,
4 (b) given asset prices and dividends, the choice for α′ * solves the 
                                          
4With the caveat that the Benveniste-Sheinkman equations of the Bellman equation (18) yield an Euler 
equation for equity that includes the tax-like distortion on equity returns.   13
maximization problem of foreign traders, (c) the IFO’s budget constraint holds and (e) the 
market-clearing conditions for assets, goods and labor markets hold. 
5.   Quantitative Analysis 
The functional forms that represent preferences and technology are the following: 
  ( ) 1 ,, 0 tt Fk n k n γγ γ − = ≤≤ 1  (21) 
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γ is the labor income share, σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, β is the elasticity of the 
rate of time preference with respect to 1+ct - h(nt ), and δ determines the wage elasticity of labor 
supply (which is equal to 1/(δ-1)). The condition 0<β≤σ comes from Epstein (1983). 
5.1    Deterministic Steady State and Calibration to Mexican Data 
The calibration strategy differs markedly from the one in Mendoza and Smith (2004). 
They normalize the capital stock to k=1 and let the steady-state equity price adjust to the value 
implied by the asset pricing condition given a set of parameter values directly inferred from the 
data or set to enable the model to match ratios of national accounts statistics. Here, we 
normalize instead the steady-state equity price so that the capital stock matches the 
deterministic, steady-state capital stock of a typical RBC-SOE model calibrated to Mexican 
data (see Mendoza (2004)). The steady state of this RBC-SOE model is a frictionless, 
neoclassical stationary equilibrium. Calibrating to this frictionless equilibrium helps focus the 
analysis on the use of price guarantees to prevent Sudden Stops triggered by margin calls that 
hit the economy only when it is highly leveraged (and hence off the long-run equilibrium).  
The risk aversion parameter does not appear in the model’s deterministic steady-state 
conditions. This parameter is set at σ =2 in line with values often used in RBC-SOE studies. 
The parameter values that enter into the supply-side system are determined as follows. The 
labor share is set at γ =0.65, in line with international evidence on labor income shares. The 
Mexican average share of labor income in value added in an annual sample for 1988-2001 is 0.34, 
but values around 0.65 are the norm in several countries and there is concern that the Mexican 
data may measure inaccurately proprietors income and other forms of labor income (see 
Mendoza (2004) for details). The real interest rate is set at 6.5 percent, which is also a value 
widely used in the RBC literature. Since the model is set to a quarterly frequency, this implies 
R=1.065
1/4. The labor disutility coefficient is set to the same value as in Mendoza and Smith 
(2004), δ =2, which implies a unitary wage elasticity of labor supply. 
As in a typical RBC calibration exercise, the calibration is designed to yield a set of 
parameter values such that the model’s deterministic steady state matches actual averages of 
the GDP shares of consumption (sc), investment (si), government purchases (sg) and net 
exports (snx). In the Mexican data, these shares are sc=0.684, si=0.19, sg=0.092, and 
snx=0.034. Since the model does not have investment or government purchases, their combined 
share (0.282) is treated as exogenous absorption of output equivalent to 28.2 percent of steady-  14
state GDP. In the stochastic simulations we keep the corresponding level of these expenditures 
constant at 28.2 percent of the value obtained for steady-state output in the calibration. 
The typical RBC-SOE model features a standard steady-state optimality condition that 
equates the marginal product of capital net of depreciation with the world interest rate, and a 
standard law of motion of the capital stock that relates the steady-state investment rate to the 
steady-state capital-output ratio. Given the values of si, γ, δ and R, these two steady-state 
conditions can be combined to yield values of the depreciation rate (dep) and the capital-output 
ratio (sk). On an annual basis, the resulting depreciation rate is 7.75 percent and sk is about 2.5 
(or 10.08 on a quarterly basis).   
In a deterministic steady state of the model of Section 2 in which the credit constraint 
does not bind and there are no price guarantees, the equity price is q = q 
f = d/(R-1). Given the 
RBC-SOE calibration criterion that the steady-state marginal product of capital net of 
depreciation equals the net world interest rate, q 
f can be re-written as Fk (k,n)/(Fk (k,n)-dep). 
With the Cobb-Douglas production function this reduces to q 
f = (1-γ)/(1-γ -si). Thus, the 
requirement that the model’s dividend rate must match a typical RBC-SOE calibration implies 
that the steady-state equity price is determined by si and γ. With the parameter values set 
above we obtain q 
f=2.19. 
Given the values of γ, δ, R, and q 
f the steady-state solutions for n, w, k, and F(k,n) 
follow from solving the supply-side system conformed by (1), (2), (9) and (21). The resulting 
steady-state capital stock is k =79.  By construction, this capital stock is also consistent with 
the estimated capital-output ratio of 2.5 and the observed Mexican investment rate of 0.19. 
The parameters that remain to be calibrated are the time-preference elasticity coefficient 
β and the financial frictions parameters a, θ  and κ. The time-preference elasticity coefficient is 
derived from the consumption Euler equation as follows. In the deterministic stationary state of 
the model there are no credit constraints and hence the endogenous rate of time preference 
equals the real interest rate: 
  1( , )
n
scF k n R
β δ
δ
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
 (25) 
Given the values of R, δ, n, F(k,n) and sc, this condition can be solved for the required value of 
β. The solution yields β =0.0118. The total stock of domestic savings at steady state follows 
then from the resource constraint as s = [c-F(k,n)(si+sg)-wn] / (R-1)= αq 
fk + b.  
Up to this point the calibration followed the typical RBC-SOE deterministic calibration 
exercise. A problem emerges, however, when we try to determine the composition of the savings 
portfolio because the allocation of savings across bonds and equity is undetermined. Any 
portfolio (α,b)∈Α×Β is consistent with the RBC-SOE deterministic steady state as long as it 
supports the unique steady-state level of savings (i.e., αq 
fk + b = s) and the margin and short-
selling constraints do not bind (b> -καq 
fk  and α > χ). Moreover, given the values of s, q 
f and 
k implied by the calibration, it follows from the definition of savings that there is only a small 
subset of portfolios in which the economy borrows in the bond market (i.e., portfolios with b<0)   15
in the set of multiple steady-state portfolios. Debt portfolios require α > 0.9. If domestic agents 
own less than 90 percent of k, their steady-state bond position is positive and grows larger the 
smaller is α. This also implies that it will take low values of κ to make the margin constraint 
bind. In particular, setting the upper bound of α at 100 percent, it takes κ ≤ 0.10 for the margin 
constraint to bind for at least some of the multiple steady-state pairs of (α,b). These low values 
of κ can be justified by considering that the margin constraint represents the fraction of 
domestic capital that is useful collateral for external debt. Several studies in the Sudden Stops 
literature provide arguments to suggest that this fraction is small (see, for example, Caballero 
and Krishnamurty (2001), Paasche (2001), Mendoza (2002), and Scheneider and Tornell (2000)).  
The stochastic RBC-SOE without credit constraints has the additional unappealing 
feature that it can lead to degenerate long-run distributions of equity and bonds in which 
domestic agents hold the smallest equity position (χ) and use bonds to engage in consumption 
smoothing and precautionary saving. The reason is that, without credit constraints and zero 
recurrent trading costs, risk-averse domestic agents demand a risk premium to hold equity (for 
standard equity-premium reasons) while risk-neutral foreign traders do not.
5 Hence, domestic 
agents end up selling all the equity they can to foreign traders, although the process takes time 
because per-trade costs slow the speed at which foreign traders adjust their equity holdings. 
To circumvent the problems of portfolio determination in the deterministic and 
stochastic RBC-SOE steady states, we calibrate the values of the financial frictions parameters 
(a, θ  and κ) so that the allocations and prices obtained with the deterministic RBC-SOE steady 
state can be closely approximated as the deterministic steady state of an economy with 
negligible (but positive) recurrent trading costs and a margin constraint that is just slightly 
binding. This calibration scenario is labeled the “nearly frictionless economy”(NFE).  
The deterministic steady state of the NFE has well-defined, unique solutions for bond 
and equity positions. In particular, foreign traders hold a stationary equity position at the price 
q = q 
f /(1+aθ). Since this price is less than q 
f, which is the price at which the return on 
domestic equity equals R, it follows that at this lower price R
q > R. Thus, foreign traders now 
require an equity premium to hold a stationary equity position. The ratio of the Lagrange 
multipliers of the domestic agent’s margin constraint and budget constraint can then be found 
to be η /λ = (R
q-R)/(R
q -Rκ). In addition, since the margin constraint binds, bond holdings 
must satisfy b = -κα q
 k, and hence a unique stationary domestic equity position can be 
obtained from the steady-state consumption Euler equation. This is the value of α that solves 
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5 With θ =0 and no price guarantees, equation (15) implies that foreign traders attain a stationary equity 
position when the equity price equals the fundamentals price, and the latter implies a stationary asset 
return equal to R.  Thus, at this steady state foreign traders hold equity at zero equity premium.   16
Equation (26) illustrates the key role of the endogenous rate of time preference in 
supporting deterministic stationary equilibria with binding credit limits: it allows the rate of 
time preference to adjust so as to make the higher long-run consumption level, implied by the 
fact that the credit constraint prevents domestic agents from borrowing as they desire in the 
transition to steady state, to be consistent with the higher effective long-run real interest rate 
also implied by the credit constraint. The recurrent trading cost is also critical. With θ=0, a 
stationary equity position for foreign traders requires a price equal to q 
f and a return on equity 
equal to R, but the latter implies that η/λ=0, so the borrowing constraint could not bind. 
In the NFE steady state, the values of a, θ and κ are set to support a deterministic 
steady state with a binding borrowing constraint that satisfies the following conditions: (1) the 
debt-GDP ratio is in line with Mexican data, (2) the allocations, factor payment rates and the 
equity price are nearly identical to those obtained for the frictionless RBC-SOE deterministic 
steady state, and (3) the elasticity of the foreign trader’s demand curve is relatively high. The 
values of the financial frictions parameters are: a = 0.2, θ = 0.001 and κ = 0.03. With these 
parameter values, and the values set earlier for γ, δ, β, and R, the NFE steady state yields 
values of c, s, n, w, d, q, and R
q nearly identical to those of the RBC-SOE deterministic steady 
state, but the NFE also has unique portfolio allocations of α = 0.931 and b = -4.825 (which 
implies a debt-GDP ratio of about 0.62). 
5.2    Stochastic Simulation Framework 
The stochastic simulations are solved over a discrete state space with 78 evenly-spaced 
nodes in the equity grid and 120 evenly-spaced nodes in the bonds grid. The lower bound for 
domestic equity is set at χ=0.84, so the equity grid spans the interval [0.84,1]. These equity 
bounds, together with the maximum equity price defined in (17) and the margin constraint, set 
the lower bound for bonds as -κ q
maxk  = -5.2. This is the largest debt that the SOE could 
leverage by holding the largest possible equity position at the highest possible price. The upper 
bound of bonds is found by solving the model repeatedly starting with an upper bound that 
supports steady state savings with the equity position at its lowest, and then increasing the 
upper bound until the grid captures the support of the ergodic distribution of bonds. The 
resulting grid spans the interval [-5.2,25.7]. The segment of debt positions inside this interval is 
relatively small, reflecting the fact that, despite the frictions induced by asset trading costs, 
domestic agents still have a preference for riskless bonds as a vehicle to smooth consumption 
and build a buffer stock of savings. 
A lower bound on domestic equity holdings of 84 percent seems much higher than the 
conventional short-selling limit set at 0 but it is consistent with the national aggregates targeted 
in the calibration. In Mexico, the average ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in the 
period 1988-2000 was 27.6 percent. Since the calibration produced an estimate of the capital-
output ratio of about 2.5, the total value of the shares of Mexican publicly traded firms 
constitutes just 11 percent of the capital stock. A large fraction of Mexico’s capital stock is 
owned by non-publicly-traded firms and by owners of residential property, and thus does not 
have a liquid market in which to trade shares with foreign residents. In general, at the aggregate   17
level of most emerging economies it is hard to argue that a large fraction of the physical capital 
stock has a liquid international market. Moreover, the result from the calibration exercise 
showing that bond positions become positive and unrealistically large when the domestic 
economy owns less than 90 percent of its capital also argues for a high value of χ.   
Productivity shocks are modeled as a two-point, symmetric Markov process that follows 
the “simple persistence” rule. The two points of the Markov chain and the transition probability 
matrix are set to produce moments of the limiting distribution of output that match the 
standard deviation and first-order autocorrelation of the quarterly cyclical component of 
Mexico’s GDP reported in Mendoza (2004) -- 2.64 percent and 0.683 respectively. The model 
matches these moments using a Markov process of productivity shocks with a standard 
deviation (σε) of 1.79 percent and a first-order autocorrelation coefficient (ρε) of 0.683. The 
simple persistence rule implies therefore that the two points of the Markov chain are symmetric 
and satisfy -εL = εH = 0.0179 and these two states have the same long-run probability of ½. The 
transition probability of remaining in either state is given by ½(1-ρε )+ρε = 0.8415 and the 
transition probability of shifting across states is ½(1-ρε ) = 0.1585. 
5.3    Baseline Results: Globalization Hazard and Sudden Stops without Price Guarantees 
The baseline results include four sets of simulation exercises. The first set is for the NFE 
case. The second set is for the economy with binding margin requirements (BMR), for which the 
margin coefficient is set at κ =0.005. The third set introduces a simple price-guarantees policy 
that sets a single, non-state-contingent guaranteed price (NSCG) for all dates and states. The 
fourth set uses the same guaranteed price but as a state-contingent guarantee (SCG) that 
applies only in a subset of the state space. 
The key result that emerges from the comparison between the NFE and BMR economies 
is that the financial frictions representing globalization hazard in the model cause Sudden Stops 
when the ratio of debt to the market value of equity is high and the equity market has enough 
liquidity (i.e., domestic agents are not at their short-selling limit). Since the comparison is 
similar to the one studied by Mendoza and Smith (2004), we keep the presentation short and 
refer the reader to their article for details.  
Figures 2 shows the long run distributions of equity and bonds in the NFE and BMR 
economies. The effect of the margin constraint is clear in the bonds distribution. The 
distribution is biased to the left in the two economies but it shifts markedly to the right in the 
BMR case. The opposite occurs with the distribution of equity. The bias to the left in the 
distribution of equity reflects the incentive that risk-averse domestic agents have to sell equity 
to risk-neutral foreign traders. Binding margin constraints shift the equity distribution further 
to the left because of the equity fire sales triggered by margin calls. 
The shifts in the distributions of equity and bonds also reflect the outcome of the 
precautionary saving effect. Domestic agents, aware of the imperfections of financial markets, 
have an incentive to build up a buffer stock of savings so as to minimize the risk of large 
declines in consumption, and in doing so they also lower the risk of facing states in which 
margin constraints bind in the long run (Figure 2 shows that the long run distribution of bonds   18
of the BMR economy rules out states with very large debt positions). Still, Table 1 shows that 
the long-run probability of binding margin constraints is about 4 percent. Sudden Stops driven 
are therefore rare but non-zero probability events in the stochastic steady state (although many 
of the states in which margin constraints bind in the long run do not trigger Sudden Stops, as 
explained below). Note also that, since the buffer stock of savings is made of a portfolio of 
equity and bonds, margin constraints cause a portfolio reallocation of savings from equity into 
bonds. Table 1 shows that the long-run average of the bonds-output ratio increases from 18 
percent in the NFE to 50 percent in the BMR economy.  
Financial frictions have negligible effects on long-run business cycle moments (see Table 
1). Hence, as in Mendoza and Smith (2004), we study Sudden Stops by examining the model’s 
dynamics in the high-debt region of the state space in which the margin constraint binds (i.e., 
the “Sudden Stop region”). Figures 3-5 show the date-0 responses (or impact effects) of 
consumption, the current account-GDP ratio (ca/y) and equity prices to a negative, one-
standard-deviation productivity shock for all possible date-0 (α,b) pairs in the Sudden Stop 
region, measured in percent of the long-run mean of each variable. The Sudden Stop region 
includes values of b that are low enough (i.e., high enough debt) for the margin constraint to 
bind, and thus produce different impact effects in the BMR economy than in the NFE. This 
region includes the first 25 nodes of the bonds grid and all 72 points of the equity grid. 
Figures 3-5 suggest that there are two key factors driving impact effects in the Sudden 
Stop region: (1) The leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of debt to the market value of equity, 
and (2) The liquidity of the equity market, defined as the difference between α and χ. Sudden 
Stops with large reversals in c and ca/y occur when the leverage ratio is high (see Figures 3 and 
4), but given high leverage the impact on asset prices is different depending on asset market 
liquidity. If the asset market is illiquid, the Sudden Stop can feature negligible asset price 
declines because domestic agents are close to χ and hence have little equity to sell (see Figure 
5), but if there is some liquidity in the asset market, the Sudden Stop in c and ca/y is 
accompanied by a fall in q. In contrast, when the leverage ratio is sufficiently low and the asset 
market is sufficiently liquid, the drop in consumption and the current account reversal are small 
(nearly as small as in the NFE case) but the drop in asset prices is larger. In this case, domestic 
agents liquidate more equity and trigger larger asset price collapses, but they do so in order to 
swap their limited borrowing ability via bonds for equity sales so as to minimize the drop in 
consumption. This pattern of larger current account corrections coinciding with smaller asset 
price collapses fits the observations of some emerging markets crises. The current account 
reversal in the first quarter of 1995 in Mexico was 5.2 percent of GDP but the drop in real 
equity prices was nearly 29 percent. In contrast, in Korea the current account reversal in the 
first quarter of 1998 was twice as large but the asset price drop was just 10 percent. 
Figure 6 illustrates Sudden Stop dynamics using the conditional forecasting functions of 
c, q and ca/y. The first two are shown as percentages of their long-run averages in the NFE and 
the last is shown as the percentage points difference relative to the long-run average in the 
NFE. These forecasting functions represent non-linear impulse response functions to a negative,   19
one-standard-deviation productivity shock conditional on initial positions of equity and bonds 
inside the Sudden Stop region. The Figures plot two sets of forecasting functions, one for a high 
leverage initial state, at which α = 0.938 and b = -4.68 (which imply a debt ratio of 60 percent 
of GDP and a leverage ratio of 3 percent of GDP), and one for a low leverage state with the 
same α but b = -3.38 (which imply a debt ratio of 43 percent of GDP and a leverage ratio of 2 
percent of GDP). Since these initial states are distant from the corresponding long-run averages, 
the data in the Figures were adjusted to remove low-frequency transitional dynamics driven by 
the convergence of bonds and equity to their long-run means. Given that c, q and ca/y have 
nearly identical long-run averages in the four baseline experiments (except for the mean of q in 
the NSCG economy, which is higher), the forecasting functions were detrended by taking 
differences relative to the NFE forecasting functions.  
The impact effects in the initial date of the forecasting functions of the BMR economy 
differ sharply across the high and low leverage states, and those of the high leverage state 
deviate significantly from those of the NFE (or from zero in terms of Figure 6, since the data 
are plotted as differences relative to the NFE). In the high leverage state of the BMR economy, 
the negative shock triggers a Sudden Stop driven by the mechanisms described in Section 3: 
Domestic agents sell equity to meet margin calls and trigger a Fisherian deflation that reduces 
further their ability to borrow. The net result is that, on impact, a one-standard-deviation shock 
to productivity causes c and q to drop by 1.5 and 0.4 percent more than in the NFE respectively 
and ca/y to rise by about 1 percentage point of GDP. In the low leverage state, domestic agents 
are better positioned to smooth consumption by substituting debt for equity to finance a current 
account deficit. As a result, the responses of c and ca/y in the BMR economy are nearly 
identical to those in the NFE, so their detrended forecasting functions hover around zero. This 
occurs even though the sales of equity still make q fall by about the same amount as in the high 
leverage scenario. Notice also that the drop in asset prices is small relative to observed Sudden 
Stops, but very large relative to the standard deviation of asset prices in the NFE. 
One caveat about the plots in Figure 6: The initial bond and equity positions used to 
generate them yield outcomes consistent with Sudden Stops, but the set of impact effects that 
the model predicts for all initial conditions inside the Sudden Stop region (including transitional 
dynamics components) are shown in Figures 3-5. As these Figures show, the Sudden Stop region 
includes scenarios with much larger consumption and current-account reversals than those 
shown in Figure 6, as well as scenarios in which there is little difference between the BMR and 
NFE because the asset market is sufficiently liquid to maintain a similar current account deficit 
by selling equity when the margin constraint binds. Precautionary saving implies, however, that 
all of the scenarios with very large reversals in consumption and the current account have zero 
probability in the long run. Notice also that, since the Sudden Stop region includes instances in 
which the margin constraint binds but fire sales of assets prevent a sharp current account 
reversal, the probability of binding margin constraints should not be interpreted as measuring 
the probability of Sudden Stops.    20
Figure 6 suggests that Sudden Stops in the model are short-lived. The responses of the 
BMR economy converge to those of the NFE in about 4 quarters. Mendoza and Smith (2004) 
obtained Sudden Stops with more persistence using higher per-trade costs, which hamper the 
foreign traders’ ability to adjust equity holdings. Mendoza (2004) also obtained more persistence 
by introducing costly capital accumulation in an environment in which margin constraints link 
the ability to borrow to the Tobin Q valuation of capital. 
5.4    Baseline Results: State-Contingent and Non-State-Contingent Price Guarantees 
The price guarantees are set as a percent above the fundamentals price in the low 
productivity state.
6 This choice is based on a theoretical result that holds assuming stationary 
decision rules (i.e., αt+1=αt, bt+1=bt) and equilibrium equity prices in the high productivity state 
that exceed a time- and state-invariant guaranteed price. Under these assumptions, it is possible 
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 q  is a necessary condition for price guarantees to be 
executed at least in some states of nature. Given the low values of a and θ, this condition 
suggests setting price guarantees above the fundamentals price in the low productivity state. 
The result does not apply strictly to the numerical solutions, however, because the decision rules 
are not generally stationary and equilibrium prices in the high productivity state can be lower 
than guaranteed prices.    
The non-state-contingent price guarantee is set ½ of a percentage point above the 
fundamentals price in the low productivity state (2.185). Hence, the guaranteed price is 2.196.
 
This guarantee is offered in all states (α,b,ε) in the NSCG economy. In contrast, the economy 
with state-contingent price guarantees provides the same guaranteed price only for (α,b) pairs 
inside the Sudden Stop region.  
Figure 7 shows the ergodic distributions of equity and bonds for the NSCG and SCG 
economies. Relative to the BMR case, the non-state-contingent guarantee shifts the distribution 
of equity (bonds) markedly to the left (right). The long-run average of the expected present 
value of excess prices (i.e., the long-run average of the G(⋅) function) is 0.01, which is about ½ 
of a percent above the mean equity price in the stochastic stationary state.  
Comparing long-run moments across Panels I, II and III of Table 1, the main change 
caused by price guarantees is the reduction in the probability of hitting states with binding 
margin constraints. The price guarantee nearly rules out the possibility of hitting these states, 
compared to the 4-percent probability obtained in the BMR economy. The long-run moments of 
the model’s endogenous variables vary slightly with the non-state-contingent guarantee. Asset-
                                          
6 Setting a guaranteed price above the fundamentals price is not awkward because the model’s 
fundamentals price does not correspond to the price of a frictionless environment. In the NFE case, asset 
markets are incomplete and risk-averse domestic agents trade equity with risk-neutral foreign traders. 
Hence, equilibrium prices reflect the equity premium and the distortions induced by incomplete markets, 
and thus differ from a fundamentals price that discounts dividends at the risk-free rate.     21
price fluctuations display less variability, persistence and co-movement with output in the 
NSCG economy relative to the NFE and BMR cases. The mean equity price increases by 0.053 
percent, slightly more than the percent difference between the guaranteed price and the 
fundamentals price of the low productivity state. The coefficient of variation of consumption 
falls by about 1/5 of a percentage point and the variability of the current account and the trade 
balance increase slightly. Consumption also becomes less correlated with GDP. 
The effects of the price guarantee on Sudden Stop dynamics are shown in Figure 6. Price 
guarantees are an effective policy for containing Sudden Stops. Comparing the NSCG and BMR 
economies in the high leverage state, the initial drop in consumption and current account 
reversal are smaller in the NSCG economy, and the drop in equity prices turns into an increase 
of about ¼ of a percentage point. In the low leverage state, the increase in equity prices in the 
NSCG economy is slightly larger than in the high leverage state, and we now obtain an increase 
in consumption and a widening of the current account deficit at date 0. The price guarantee 
results in a price of equity at date 0 that is 2/3 of a percentage point higher in the NSCG than 
in the BMR economy in both the high and low leverage states. Foreign traders execute the price 
guarantee in both states of the NSCG economy. 
Figure 8 plots the levels of equity prices in the low productivity state of the NFE, BMR 
and NSCG economies for all equity and bond positions. The plots show that the non-state-
contingent guarantee not only results in higher prices in the Sudden Stop region, but it actually 
results in higher prices in all states. In fact, the guarantee produces significantly higher asset 
prices in the NSCG economy than in either the NFE or BMR economies in states well outside 
the Sudden Stop region. This is a potentially important drawback of non-state-contingent price 
guarantees: they distort asset prices even when the economy is in states in which it is very far 
from being vulnerable to Sudden Stops.  
One alternative to remedy the drawbacks of non-state-contingent price guarantees is to 
consider state-contingent guarantees. Figure 7 shows that the SCG economy yields a long-run 
distribution of equity (bonds) that is less skewed to the left (right) than in the NSCG economy. 
Table 1 shows that the changes in the long-run business cycle moments of the SCG economy 
relative to the NFE and BMR cases are qualitatively similar to those noted for the NSCG 
economy but the magnitude of the changes is smaller. The SCG economy still features near-zero 
percent probability of observing states of nature in which the margin constraint binds. Hence, 
the state-contingent guarantee is as effective as the non-state-contingent guarantee at 
eliminating the possibility of hitting states with binding margin requirements in the long run. 
Figure 6 shows that, in both the high and low leverage states, the SCG economy features 
nearly-identical date-0 responses in consumption and the current account as the NSCG economy 
and a slightly smaller recovery in asset prices. After date 0, the SCG economy converges faster 
to the dynamic paths of the NFE economy. Finally, a comparison of the middle and bottom 
plots of Figure 8 shows that the SCG economy yields higher asset prices mainly in the Sudden 
Stop region of the state space. Thus, the policy of state contingent guarantees induces smaller 
distortions on asset demand and asset prices than the non-state-contingent guarantees,   22
particularly outside the Sudden Stop region, yet it has similar effects in terms of its ability to 
prevent Sudden Stops. 
5.5  Normative Implications of the Baseline Simulations 
We study next the normative implications of the baseline simulations by examining how 
domestic welfare and the value of foreign securities firms varies across the NFE, BMR, NSCG 
and SCG experiments. Welfare costs, W(α,b,ε), are measured by computing compensating 
variations in date-0 consumption that equate expected lifetime utility in the BMR, NSCG and 
SCG economies with that of the NFE for any triple (α,b,ε) in the state space. Welfare effects 
are typically computed as compensating variations that apply to consumption at all dates, but 
in principle both measures are useful for converting ordinal units of utility into the cardinal 
units needed for quantitative welfare comparisons. The two measures yield identical welfare 
rankings for the four experiments, but the measure based on date-0 consumption highlights 
better the welfare costs of Sudden Stops and the potential benefits of price guarantees because 
large deviations from the consumption dynamics of the NFE occur only in Sudden Stop states 
(in which bond and equity positions are distant from their long-run averages).  
The model belongs to the class of models in which capital markets are used to smooth 
consumption over the business cycle. Hence, since it is well-known that the welfare cost of 
“typical” consumption fluctuations is small in these models, the mean welfare costs of deviating 
from the NFE (E[W(α,b,ε)] computed with the ergodic distribution) should be small. As Table 2 
shows, welfare comparisons based on date-0 consumption preserve this result. Agents in the 
BMR, NSCG and SCG economies incur average welfare losses relative to the NFE equivalent to 
cuts of less than 0.07 percent in c0. This is also in line with Mendoza’s (1991) results showing 
trivial welfare costs for giving up access to world capital markets in an RBC-SOE model.  
The situation is very different when comparing welfare conditional on Sudden Stop 
states. Since the Bellman equation implies that lifetime utility as of date 0 can be expressed as 
V(0)= u(0) + exp(-v(0))E0[V(1)], Table 2 decomposes the total welfare cost into a short-run 
cost (i.e., the percent change in c0 that equates u(0) in the distorted economies with that of the 
NFE) and a long-run cost (i.e., the percent change in c0 that equates exp(-v(0))E0[V(1)] in the 
distorted economies with that of the NFE). The Table also lists the date-1 rate of time 
preference, exp(-v(0)), to show that changes in the endogenous subjective discount factor play a 
negligible role in the welfare analysis. 
In the high leverage Sudden Stop state, which is the one that in the BMR economy 
produces dynamics closer to those of observed Sudden Stops, the short-run welfare costs show 
that domestic agents are worse off in the BMR economy or in the economies with price 
guarantees than in the NFE. The welfare cost is 1.4 percent for the BMR economy and 0.9 and 
1 percent for the NSCG and SCG economies respectively. This ranking reflects the fact that 
declines in date-0 consumption, and hence u(0), are smallest in the NFE because it provides the 
best environment for consumption smoothing, followed by the economies in which price 
guarantees help contain the Sudden Stop that occurs in the BMR.    23
The long-run costs are negative (i.e., domestic agents make welfare gains) because 
consumption after date-0 increases at least temporarily in the BMR, NSCG and SCG economies. 
In the high leverage case of the BMR economy, the binding credit constraint tilts the 
consumption profile by reducing consumption at date 0 and increasing it later, resulting in a 
long-run welfare gain of about 1 percent. Consumption tilting is also at work in the NSCG and 
SCG economies, but in addition the higher (distorted) asset prices lead to higher consumption 
relative to both the BMR and the NFE for three quarters beyond the initial date (see Figure 6). 
This expansion of consumption in the economies with price guarantees is driven in turn by 
larger current account deficits, which are financed by equity sales at higher prices. After the 
Sudden Stop at date 0, domestic agents set to rebalance their portfolios from equity into bonds 
gradually, but in economies with price guarantees the capital inflows from equity sales exceed 
the outflows from bond purchases in the early periods of transition thus producing larger 
external deficits. The result are long-run welfare gains in the high leverage NSCG and SCG 
economies (1.9 and 1.3 percent respectively) that are large enough to offset the short-run costs, 
so that domestic agents obtain total welfare gains of 1 percent in the NSCG and 0.3 percent in 
the SCG. These results show that the asset price changes induced by price guarantees represent 
non-trivial distortions relative to the NFE. Moreover, as we show below, the same distortions 
that increase domestic welfare in the high leverage Sudden Stop states of the NSCG and SCG 
economies reduce the value of the foreign traders’ firms in those states. 
At equilibrium, the foreign traders’ net returns can be written as: 
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The terms inside the square brackets in the right-hand-side of this expression represent the 
foreign traders’ dividend earnings, the net value of their trades at equilibrium, and the trading 
costs they incur. Notice that, since the budget constraint of the IFO holds, the lump sum taxes 
paid by foreign traders cancel with the value of the executed guarantees and hence the two do 
not appear in the above expression. Thus, price guarantees distort the traders’ optimality 
condition with the moral hazard effect identified in (15) but do not have direct income effects. 
  As explained in Section 2, the payoff of foreign traders D is the value of their firms: the 
expected present discounted value of the stream of net returns. In the recursive representation 
of the equilibrium, the present value of returns is a function D(α,b,ε), and hence we can 
compute long-run averages of net returns, E[D(α,b,ε)], and values of D(α,b,ε) conditional on 
Sudden Sop states. Since the model has a well-defined stochastic steady state, the long-run 
mean of net returns is given by .  [] 1 ˆ []( 1 ) ED k E R R π − = −
Table 2 shows that, relative to the NFE, E[D] and  [ ] ˆ π E are 14.5 percent higher in the 
BMR economy and 52.6 and 42.5 percent higher in the NSCG and SCG economies respectively. 
Thus, from the perspective of the long-run average of the value of their firms, foreign traders are 
better off in the BMR economy and significantly better off in the economies with price 
guarantees than in the NFE. Table 2 also shows that this is the case mainly because of the 
increased average equity holdings of foreign traders in the BMR, NSCG and SCG economies, 
and the corresponding increase in their average dividend earnings. The contribution of changes   24
in the value of trades to changes in E[D] and [ ] ˆ E π is zero by definition (since the unconditional 
means of αt and αt+1 are identical) and the contribution of changes in trading costs is negligible. 
Foreign traders build up a larger equity position in the BMR economy as a result of the 
rebalancing of the portfolio of domestic agents from equity into bonds shown in Figure 2, and 
also because in some states foreign traders buy assets at crash prices (i.e., when domestic agents 
fire sale assets to meet margin calls). Foreign traders are much better off when price guarantees 
are in place because the price guarantees are equivalent to a guaranteed minimum return, which 
reduces sharply the downside risk of holding equity and results in even larger domestic portfolio 
reallocations from equity into bonds.   
The result that the payoff of foreign traders is significantly higher on average in the long 
run when price guarantees are in place hides the fact that, when evaluated conditional on a 
Sudden Stop state, the payoff of foreign traders is lower in economies with price guarantees. 
Table 2 shows that the ranking of foreign traders’ payoffs obtained by comparing D(α,b,ε) 
across Sudden Stop states with low or high leverage is the opposite from the one obtained by 
comparing E[D]. Relative to the NFE, the present value of profits is nearly unchanged in the 
BMR economy and it falls in the high and low leverage states of the economies with price 
guarantees (by about 0.7 and 0.3 percent in the NSCG and SCG economies respectively). The 
latter occurs because in the NSCG and SCG economies the increase in the long-run average of 
net returns ( [ ] ˆ π E ) is not sufficient to offset the short-run decline in returns ( ) that 
occurs at date 0 when a Sudden Stop hits (see Table 2). In turn, this decline in net returns at 
date 0 is almost entirely driven by changes in the value of trades. The value of trades in the 
high (low) leverage state rises from 0.36 in the NFE to 3.93 (3.22) in the BMR economy and to 
about 3.95 (3.24) in the NSCG and SCG economies. In the BMR economy, the increase reflects 
the domestic agents’ fire sales of equity to meet margin calls. The equity price falls, and when it 
falls foreign traders demand more equity and the value of their trades increases. In the 
economies with price guarantees, the moral hazard distortion exacerbates this effect by 
increasing the foreign traders’ equity demand and producing equilibrium prices higher than in 
the BMR economy. In line with the increase in trading values, trading costs rise sharply from 
the NFE economy to the other economies, but their absolute amounts remain small. Dividend 
earnings do not change because date-0 equity holdings are the same in all four economies and 
the dividends of domestic firms are independent of financial frictions and price guarantees.   
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In principle, the present value of foreign traders’ net returns conditional on a Sudden 
Stop state could be higher or lower with price guarantees than without depending on whether 
the short-run effect lowering date-0 net returns is weaker or stronger than the long-run effect 
increasing average net returns. The strength of these effects depends in turn on how much and 
how fast equilibrium equity positions and equity prices move, which depends on the parameters 
driving the demand for equity of domestic agents and foreign traders. According to Table 2, 
however, the substantial increases in the average payoff of foreign traders (E[D]) in the NSCG 
and SCG economies exceed by large margins the small reductions in D(α,b,ε) to which foreign 
traders are exposed with very low probability in the long run.    25
To analyze the distributional implications of price guarantees, consider the following 
“resource constraint” implied by the households’ budget constraint and the definition of the 
traders’ net returns: 
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The right-hand-side of this expression can be read as GNP (i.e., GDP plus net factor payments 
abroad in the form of dividends on equity and interest on bonds) plus the current account (i.e., 
changes in net foreign assets resulting from bond and equity trades), or GDP minus net exports.  
  As noted earlier, the long-run averages of consumption in the NFE, BMR, NSCG and 
SCG economies are nearly identical (see Table 1). On the other hand, Table 2 shows that the 
long-run average of the foreign traders’ dividend earnings is higher in the latter three than in 
the NFE. Taking the long-run average of equation (28), it follows from these two observations 
that domestic agents are able to sustain similar long-run average consumption levels because 
their average savings remain nearly unchanged: The drop in dividend earnings on equity is 
nearly offset by increased interest income from bonds. Thus, these baseline results suggest that 
globalization hazard and price guarantees as modeled in this paper do not alter the long-run 
average shares of global income and wealth across the small open economy and the rest of the 
world. Foreign traders receive a larger share of domestic GDP but GNP is unaffected because 
domestic agents increase bond holdings and thus collect more interest income from abroad. The 
independence of GDP from financial frictions and price guarantees is a strong assumption that 
plays a key role in this result. The SOE assumption also plays a role because it allows the 
domestic portfolio swap of equity for bonds to occur without increasing the price of these bonds, 
which would lower the world interest rate. 
  Short-run distributional effects at a Sudden Stop state are different. GNP and GDP are 
unchanged across the four simulations, but there is a redistribution of world income via the 
current account. Relative to the NFE, foreign traders transfer income to domestic households in 
the BMR, NSCG and SCG economies, as the value of trades in the third term of the right-hand-
side of (28) increases because domestic agents fire-sale equity to meet margin calls. But whether 
the domestic economy receives more or less income from the rest of the world as a whole 
depends on whether the fire sale of assets can prevent the current account reversal, which in 
turn depends on the leverage ratio and the liquidity of the asset market. Table 2 shows that 
falls at date 0 in the high and low leverage states, but Figure 6 shows that the reversal 
in ca/y is larger in the former. Thus, the high leverage state features a redistribution of income 
from foreign traders to domestic agents via the equity market, but the larger current account 
reversal indicates that this redistribution is more than offset by the loss of access to the credit 
market, so that the domestic economy reduces the share of world output that it absorbs. In 
contrast, in the low leverage state the current account deficit remains close to the level of the 
NFE and hence the domestic economy maintains its share of world output. These results hold 
across the BMR, NSCG and SCG economies compared to the NFE but the effects are stronger 
in the economies with price guarantees.  
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The above results show that, comparing long-run averages of the payoffs of domestic 
agents and foreign traders at the stochastic steady state, foreign traders are significantly better 
off in the economies with price guarantees than in the NFE or BMR economies while domestic 
agents are nearly indifferent. This suggests that price guarantees could be close to a win-win 
situation, but this result depends on controversial features of the model. In particular, domestic 
agents are nearly indifferent between the long-run outcomes of the four economies because of the 
trivial cost of consumption fluctuations in models of the class examined here, and foreign traders 
make large gains in the BMR, NSCG and SCG economies because their dividend earnings are 
unaffected by financial frictions. Moreover, from the perspective of Sudden Stop states, the 
moral hazard distortion of economies with price guarantees yields persistently higher asset prices 
which set in motion mechanisms that redistribute income from foreign traders to domestic 
agents by more than is needed if the aim were just to recover the outcome of the NFE, hence 
making domestic agents better off and foreign traders worse off. Still, foreign traders in the 
model suffer little because the sharp increase in E[D] in the NSCG and SCG economies dwarfs 
the small, near-zero-probability reduction in D(α,b,ε) for Sudden Stop states. 
5.6    Sensitivity Analysis 
  Table 3 reports the results of a sensitivity analysis that evaluates the robustness of the 
baseline results to the following parameter changes: Columns (II) and (III), larger and more 
persistent productivity shocks (σε =0.024 and ρε =0.8), Column (IV), higher price guarantees (1 
percent above q 
f(εL)), Column (V), higher recurrent trading costs (θ =0.01), and Column (VI), 
higher per-trade costs (a =2, which implies an elasticity of the foreign traders’ demand function 
of 0.5). Column (I) reproduces results for the corresponding baseline simulations. The Table 
shows panels with results for the BMR, NSCG and SCG economies for all six scenarios. In each 
case, three sets of results are listed: (a) Sudden Stop effects as measured by the detrended, date-
0 forecasting functions conditional on the high leverage state, (b) key moments of the ergodic 
distribution, and (c) changes in the payoffs of domestic agents and foreign traders, relative to 
the corresponding NFE simulation, for the high leverage Sudden Stop state and the long-run 
average of the stochastic steady state. 
  Consider first the BMR panel. Columns (I)-(VI) show that the results derived from the 
comparison of the baseline NFE and BMR economies are robust to the parameter changes 
considered here. Column (IV) has no data for the BMR panel because the BMR economy does 
not have price guarantees. The increases in σε and ρε resulted in small changes in Columns (II) 
and (III) relative to Column (I). The exceptions are the probability of binding margin 
constraints, which rises (falls) to 4.2 (2.3) percent when  ε (σε) increases, and the long-run 
average of the value of the foreign traders’ firms, which falls to 12.2 and 4.4 percent in Columns 
(II) and (III) respectively. The changes in the probability of margin calls result from portfolio 
rebalancing effects. More persistent (variable) shocks increase (reduce) slightly the long-run 
average of domestic equity holdings, and have the opposite effects on the long-run average of 
bond holdings. As a result, the economy with more persistent (variable) shocks is more (less) 
likely to hit low bond positions (i.e., high debt positions) in which the margin constraint binds.  
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In line with the findings of Mendoza and Smith (2004), Columns (V) and (VI) show that 
BMR economies with higher θ or higher a display larger Sudden Stops, with the latter showing 
stronger effects. The long-run probability of margin calls is also sharply higher in these 
economies, reaching 16.7 percent with θ =0.01 and 19.4 percent with a =2. The BMR economy 
with a =2 is the only scenario in Table 3 that can account for both large consumption and 
current account reversals and large drops in asset prices, as observed in actual Sudden Stops. 
This scenario also results in increased long-run variability in consumption and asset prices, and 
sharply higher domestic welfare costs. The cost in the high leverage Sudden Stop state is 4.1 
percent and the long-run average cost is 0.1 percent (which is small but nearly ten times bigger 
than in the BMR baseline). 
Comparing now Columns (I)-(VI) across the BMR, NSCG and SCG panels, we find that 
price guarantees always work to virtually eliminate the long-run probability of hitting states 
with binding margin constraints. On the other hand, the long-run probability of executing the 
guarantees is high in the NSCG economy, ranging between 29 and 34 percent in all scenarios 
except the one with higher σε, in which it falls to 15 percent. In contrast, the probability of 
executing the guarantees in the SCG economy is below 1 percent in all the scenarios except 
those with θ =0.01 and a =2, in which it reaches 6 and 3.2 percent respectively. Thus, state-
contingent guarantees are as effective as non-state-contingent guarantees at reducing the long-
run probability of margin calls, with the advantage that in the SCG economy the IFO would be 
trading much less frequently. 
A comparison of Columns (I) and (IV) shows that rising the guaranteed price to a level 
1 percent above q 
f(εL), twice as large than in the baseline simulations, the NSCG and SCG 
economies dampen the Sudden Stops of the BMR economy even more that in the baseline. With 
the higher price guarantee in Column (IV), the fall in c is just 0.5 (0.6) percent in the NSCG 
(SCG), compared to 0.8 (0.9) percent in the corresponding baseline simulations. Similarly, the 
reversal in ca/y in the NSCG (SCG) is just 0.3 (0.4) percentage points of GDP in Column (IV), 
compared to 0.6 (0.7) in Column (I). On the other hand, the economies with higher guarantees 
prop up asset prices in the Sudden Stop state even more than in Column (I), with price 
increases of 0.7 (0.6) percent in the NSCG (SCG) economy. In line with the smaller 
consumption declines and larger price increases, the domestic welfare gain in the high leverage 
Sudden Stop state increases to 2.4 (0.9) percent in Column (IV) of the NSCG (SCG) economy 
compared to 1 (0.3) percent in the corresponding baseline simulations, while the long-run 
welfare losses remain nearly unchanged across Columns (I) and (IV). At the same time as the 
domestic welfare gains in the Sudden Stop state grow, the decline in the payoff of the foreign 
traders in the same state grows from 0.7 (0.3) percent in the NSCG (SCG) baseline to 1.4 (0.9) 
percent in the NSCG (SCG) with higher guarantees. In contrast, the long-run average of the 
traders’ payoff increases with the higher guarantees. Thus, the results regarding the effects of 
price guarantees obtained with the baseline simulations are qualitatively similar to those 
obtained with higher guarantees, but quantitatively the higher guarantees induce larger moral   28
hazard distortions which result in weaker Sudden Stops but larger redistribution effects across 
foreign traders and domestic agents. 
Column (VI) shows that, if the baseline level of price guarantees is applied to an 
economy with higher per-trade asset trading costs, the price guarantees still work to weaken the 
real effects of Sudden Stops relative to those in the BMR economy. However, with a =2 the 
guarantee set 0.5 percent above q 
f(εL) is insufficient to prevent marked reversals in c and ca/y 
and a sharp drop in q. Consequently, domestic agents suffer a substantial welfare loss of 1.5 
(2.6) percent in the high leverage Sudden Stop state of the NSCG (SCG) economy, instead of 
the small gains obtained in the corresponding baseline simulations with a=0.2. Moreover, the 
long-run average of welfare costs increases about 5 (2) times in the NSCG (SCG) economy with 
a=2 relative to the same simulations with a=0.2. Interestingly, the payoff of the foreign traders 
in the high leverage Sudden Stop state is larger in the NSCG and SCG economies with a=2 
than in their baseline counterparts with a=0.2. In fact, in the SCG economy with a=2 the value 
of the foreign traders’ firm in the high leverage state is even higher than that in the 
corresponding NFE economy.  
The above results show that, for a given guaranteed price, there can be a sufficiently 
high value of a such that the distortions of globalization hazard and international moral hazard 
combine to yield outcomes in which domestic agents suffer large welfare losses at Sudden Stop 
states, but still these losses are smaller than in the BMR economy without guarantees. 
Moreover, for a given value of a, higher guarantees dampen Sudden Stops more and produce 
welfare gains at Sudden Stop states. These findings would suggest that the IFO should set 
higher price guarantees the higher are trading costs. The results also show, however, that 
economies with higher a face higher long-run averages of welfare costs with price guarantees 
than without them (the cost is 1/3 of a percent in the NSCG panel of Column (VI), compared 
to 1/10 of a percent in the corresponding BMR). In addition, economies with higher guarantees 
and the baseline value of a also yield larger long-run welfare losses with price guarantees (see 
Column IV). Thus, if per-trade trading costs are high, increasing price guarantees makes 
domestic agents better off at Sudden Stop states by weakening more the real effects of 
globalization hazard, but the stronger adverse effects of international moral hazard make 
domestic agents worse off on average in the long run. 
The findings of the sensitivity analysis suggest that the size of per-trade costs plays a 
crucial role in determining the effectiveness of price guarantees and the direction of the tradeoff 
between globalization hazard and moral hazard. Mendoza and Smith (2004) showed that this 
parameter is also crucial for the model’s ability to account for asset price collapses of the 
magnitude observed in Sudden Stops, and documented empirical evidence of trading costs in 
actual asset markets roughly in line with the model’s predictions. Using the same values of a 
and θ as in the baseline calibration of this paper, they found that trading costs in the BMR 
economy peak inside the Sudden Stop region and reach a maximum of 6.4 percent of equity 
returns. The empirical literature they surveyed estimates trading costs ranging from 4.8 to 8.8 
percent across industrial countries and emerging markets. Nevertheless, the crucial feature is not   29
the magnitude of a itself but the elasticity of world demand for the SOE’s equity, which can be 
influenced by factors other than standard measures of trading costs. The findings of this paper 
suggest that, if this elasticity is high, it is relatively easy to design a system of state-contingent 
price guarantees that reduces the probability of margin calls, undoes the Sudden Stop effects of 
globalization hazard, and makes domestic agents better off at Sudden Stop states with negligible 
effects on foreign traders returns in those states, and with trivial implications on the long-run 
welfare of domestic agents. On the other hand, as the elasticity falls, price guarantees still 
weaken Sudden Stops but the tradeoff between globalization hazard and moral hazard can have 
negative consequences for domestic welfare.    
6.   Conclusions 
The equilibrium asset pricing theory presented in this paper suggests that, in the 
presence of globalization hazard characterized by world capital market frictions, providing ex-
ante price guarantees on the emerging markets asset class can be an effective means to contain 
Sudden Stops. The same theory predicts, however, that these guarantees introduce a distortion 
that induces an international moral hazard effect propping up the foreign investors’ demand for 
emerging markets assets. Hence, ex-ante price guarantees create a tradeoff between the benefits 
of undoing globalization hazard and the costs of creating international moral hazard. 
 The paper borrows from Mendoza and Smith (2004) the setup of a dynamic, stochastic 
general equilibrium model of asset prices in which collateral constraints and asset trading costs 
are the sources of globalization hazard causing Sudden Stops. Collateral constraints are modeled 
as margin constraints that limit the ability of domestic agents to leverage foreign debt on equity 
holdings. Asset trading costs are incurred by foreign traders and take the form of per-trade costs 
and recurrent costs paid regardless of trading activity. In this environment, typical realizations 
of the underlying shocks that drive business cycles trigger margin calls if they hit the economy 
when its stock of foreign debt is sufficiently large relative to the market value of domestic 
equity. Margin calls lead to a fire sale of equity by domestic agents and a Fisherian debt-
deflation of asset prices. If domestic asset markets are relatively illiquid, the result is a Sudden 
Stop with a collapse in consumption, a current account reversal and a fall in asset prices. 
This paper introduced into the Mendoza-Smith model an IFO that offers foreign traders 
ex-ante guarantees on the prices of an emerging economy’s assets by setting up a facility 
credibly committed to buy these assets from them at pre-announced minimum prices. If the 
guarantees are executed, their cost is financed with a lump sum tax on foreign traders’ returns. 
The international moral hazard distortion that these guarantees create increases the foreign 
traders’ demand for the emerging economy’s assets by an amount proportional to the traders’ 
conditional expected present value of the excess of guaranteed prices over market prices. 
The quantitative analysis based on a calibration to Mexican data showed that a 
guaranteed price set ½ to 1 percent above the model’s “fundamentals” price in a low 
productivity state reduces significantly the Sudden Stop effects of globalization hazard. This 
guarantee also eliminates the long-run probability of margin calls in the stochastic steady state. 
If the guarantee is non-state-contingent, however, the IFO trades often (with a long-run   30
probability of executing the guarantee of about 1/3), and the model predicts persistent 
overvaluation of asset prices above the prices obtained without globalization hazard. The IFO 
trades much less often, with a long run probability below 1/100, if the same guaranteed price is 
offered as a state-contingent guarantee that applies only at high levels of external debt. These 
state-contingent guarantees are no less effective at containing Sudden Stops and they do not 
result in persistent asset overvaluation. 
The effectiveness of price guarantees to prevent Sudden Stops and increase social welfare 
hinges on the relative magnitude of globalization hazard and international moral hazard. In the 
model of this paper, the size of per-trade costs that determine the price elasticity of world 
demand for the emerging economy’s assets is a key determinant of both: The Fisherian debt-
deflation depends on how much prices have to fall for foreign traders’ to accommodate the fire 
sales of domestic assets. The moral hazard distortion increases foreign demand for domestic 
assets by an amount equal to the product of the expected present value of excess prices 
multiplied by the price elasticity. With per-trade costs that yield an elasticity of 5, the 
guaranteed price of ½ to 1 percent above the low-productivity fundamentals price reduces 
Sudden Stop effects on consumption, asset prices and the current account. This results in 
domestic welfare gains when the economy is at a Sudden Stop state, with negligible changes in 
long-run welfare. At the same time, the value of foreign traders’ firms in a Sudden Stop state 
falls slightly but the long-run average rises sharply. Hence, in this case the benefits of price 
guarantees to contain globalization hazard outweigh the costs of international moral hazard.  
These results are reverted when per-trade costs yield an elasticity of world demand for 
domestic equity of ½. In this case, globalization hazard causes larger Sudden Stops and higher 
price guarantees are needed to contain them. However, even with the guarantees at ½ to 1 
percent above the low-productivity fundamentals price, which cannot prevent reversals in 
consumption and the current account, the moral hazard distortion is magnified significantly. 
Welfare gains for the emerging economy at Sudden Stop states are smaller, and the economy 
suffers non-trivial welfare losses in the stochastic steady state. In this case, price guarantees 
yield a short-term improvement in macroeconomic indicators and welfare because they weaken 
globalization hazard, but international moral hazard outweighs this benefit and causes a long-
run welfare loss. This outcome can be altered increasing guaranteed prices (so that Sudden Stop 
effects are contained) and adjusting the state-contingent structure of the policy (so that the 
moral hazard distortion is weakened) at the same time.  
The challenge to the IFO is to design ex-ante price guarantees that yield outcomes that 
clearly dominate those obtained when there is no policy in place to contain Sudden Stops. The 
findings of our quantitative analysis, particularly those highlighting the advantages of state-
contingent guarantees, illustrate the complexity of this task. But the task is also difficult 
because designing an effective system of price guarantees requires a “useful” model of asset 
prices (i.e., a model that explains the quantitative features of Sudden Stops and that can be 
used to quantify the effects of the guarantees taking into account how they affect the optimal 
plans of forward-looking agents). With trading costs in the neighborhood of those suggested by   31
the empirical literature, the Mendoza-Smith model produces large reversals in consumption and 
the current account, and collapses in asset prices. On the other hand, the model is by 
construction unable to account for the Sudden Stops’ large output and investment collapses. 
Moreover, the challenge to develop a “useful” model applies to ex-ante as well as ex-post price 
guarantees. The ex-post systems of the Lerrick-Meltzer and IMF proposals assume that “useful” 
models are at hand to establish sustainable levels of external debt, as well as “normal” and 
crash prices of emerging economies’ assets. This paper makes some progress towards developing 
a “useful” model for designing a system of ex-ante price guarantees to prevent Sudden Stops, 
but clearly there is a lot left for further research.      32
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Table 1. Long Run Business Cycle Moments 
                 











GDP 7.833  2.644  1.000  1.000  0.683 
consumption 5.366  2.185  0.826  0.853  0.770 
current account-GDP ratio  0.000  1.347  0.509  0.979  0.660 
trade balance-GDP ratio  0.315  0.948  0.358  0.564  0.811 
equity price  2.187  0.121  0.046  0.961  0.606 
foreign debt-GDP ratio  0.177  56.694  21.442  -0.076  0.997 
debt-equity ratio  0.010  2.888  1.092  0.000  0.001 
          
II. BMR Economy (probability of binding margin constraints = 3.973%) 
GDP 7.833  2.644  1.000  1.000  0.683 
consumption 5.365  2.186  0.827  0.856  0.771 
current account-GDP ratio  0.000  1.324  0.501  0.982  0.664 
trade balance-GDP ratio  0.315  0.940  0.355  0.565  0.823 
equity price  2.187  0.121  0.046  0.962  0.609 
foreign debt-GDP ratio  0.499  37.964  14.358  -0.118  0.994 
debt-equity ratio  0.026  2.007  0.759  0.000  0.001 
          
III. NSCG Economy (probability of binding margin constraints = 0.001%) 
GDP 7.833  2.644  1.000  1.000  0.683 
consumption 5.362  2.052  0.776  0.790  0.724 
current account-GDP ratio  0.000  1.487  0.562  0.968  0.660 
trade balance-GDP ratio  0.315  1.111  0.420  0.631  0.750 
equity price  2.198  0.099  0.037  0.891  0.384 
foreign debt-GDP ratio  1.336  41.053  15.526  0.001  0.992 
debt-equity ratio  0.071  2.186  0.827  0.000  0.006 
          
IV. SCG Economy (probability of binding margin constraints = 0.001%) 
GDP 7.833  2.644  1.000  1.000  0.683 
consumption 5.364  2.121  0.802  0.834  0.765 
current account-GDP ratio  0.000  1.380  0.522  0.974  0.660 
trade balance-GDP ratio  0.315  1.000  0.378  0.599  0.788 
equity price  2.188  0.121  0.046  0.903  0.630 
foreign debt-GDP ratio  1.114  34.141  12.912  -0.067  0.991 
debt-equity ratio  0.059  1.810  0.685  0.000  0.004 
         
Note: NFE is nearly frictionless economy, BMR is economy with binding margin requirements, NSCG 
is economy with binding margin requirements and non-state-contingent guarantees, and SCG is 
economy with binding margin requirements and state-contingent guarantees.  Table 2.  Payoffs of Domestic Agents and Foreign Traders in Baseline Simulations 
 
   NFE  BMR  NSCG  SCG 
I.  Long-run averages 
Domestic Agents      
Welfare  cost  1/    0.017 0.062 0.057 
Foreign Traders      
   Present value of traders' returns  17.920  20.519  27.350  25.529 
     percent change w.r.t. NFE    14.499  52.621  42.460 
   Returns  0.280  0.321  0.427  0.399 
     (a) dividend earnings  0.280  0.320  0.427  0.399 
     (b) trading costs  1.1E-05 2.3E-05 8.8E-05 1.6E-04 
      
II.  High leverage Sudden Stop State 
Domestic Agents      
   Welfare cost 1/    0.367  -1.036  -0.317 
     (a) short-run cost 2/    1.376  0.862  0.978 
     (b)  long-run cost 3/    -1.010  -1.899  -1.295 
   Date-1 rate of time preference  1.58  1.56  1.57  1.57 
Foreign Traders      
   Present value of traders' returns  10.931  10.940  10.858  10.901 
     percent change w.r.t. NFE    0.082  -0.670  -0.276 
   Returns at date 0  -0.192  -3.770  -3.796  -3.791 
     (a) dividend earnings  0.166  0.166  0.166  0.166 
     (b) value of trades  0.359  3.927  3.953  3.948 
     (c) trading costs  1.6E-04 9.8E-03 9.8E-03 9.8E-03 
      
III.  Low leverage Sudden Stop State 
Domestic Agents      
   Welfare cost 1/    0.215  -1.194  -0.393 
     (a) short-run cost 2/    0.055  -0.356  -0.293 
     (b)  long-run cost 3/    0.160  -0.838  -0.100 
   Date-1 rate of time preference  1.59  1.59  1.59  1.59 
Foreign Traders      
   Present value of traders' returns  10.931  10.937  10.854  10.901 
     percent change w.r.t. NFE    0.055  -0.707  -0.272 
   Returns at date 0  -0.192  -3.056  -3.077  -3.074 
     (a) dividend earnings  0.166  0.166  0.166  0.166 
     (b) value of trades  0.359  3.215  3.237  3.234 
     (c) trading costs  1.6E-04 6.7E-03 6.7E-03 6.7E-03 
1/ Compensating variation in date-0 consumption that equates expected lifetime utility obtained in the 
BMR, NSCG and SCG economies with that of the NFE. 
2/ Compensating variation in date-0 consumption that equates date-0 period utility obtained in the 
BMR, NSCG and SCG economies with that of the NFE. 
3/ Difference of total welfare cost minus short-run cost. Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis 
   Baseline   Productivity Shocks   Guarantees     Trading Costs 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)    (V)  (VI) 
        ρ  = 0.8  σ ε  = 2.4%  1%  above  q
f   θ  = 0.01 a = 2 
I.  BMR Economy 
Initial responses in high leverage state              
  consumption  -1.335  -1.380  -1.404  n.a.   -1.453  -3.059 
  current account-GDP ratio  0.939  0.972  0.997  n.a.   1.023  2.157 
  equity price  -0.413  -0.413  -0.413  n.a.   -0.412  -4.324 
  traders' returns  -4.529  -4.526  -4.526  n.a.   -4.522  -4.866 
Moments of the ergodic distribution              
Prob. of binding mar. cons. (%)  3.973 4.200  2.331  n.a.   16.740 19.444 
Averages        n.a.      
  consumption  5.365 5.369  5.366     5.369  5.378 
  equity price  2.187 2.187  2.187  n.a.   2.183  2.183 
  equity holdings  0.883 0.885  0.861  n.a.   0.906  0.907 
Standard deviations (%)      n.a.      
  consumption  2.186  2.382  2.721  n.a.   2.169  2.454 
  current account-GDP ratio  1.324  1.325 2.020      1.432  1.428 
  equity price  0.121  0.184 0.100  n.a.   0.114  0.463 
Domestic welfare loss1/      n.a.      
  high leverage state  0.367 0.361  0.389  n.a.   0.490  4.074 
  long-run average  0.017 0.013  0.012  n.a.   0.099  0.110 
Change in PDV of traders' returns1/             
  high leverage state  0.083  0.082  0.095  n.a.   3.448  0.924 
  long-run average  14.502  12.163  4.354  n.a.   34.519 27.531 
              
II.  NSCG Economy 
Initial responses in high leverage state              
  consumption  -0.840  -0.875  -0.901 -0.503    -0.885  -2.205 
  current account-GDP ratio 0.591  0.616  0.640  0.354    0.623  1.554 
  equity price  0.259  0.274  0.214  0.718    0.362  -3.256 
  traders' returns  -4.562  -4.560 -4.561  -4.586   -4.561  -4.926 
Moments of the ergodic distribution              
Prob. of binding mar. cons. (%)  0.001 0.017  0.024  0.002    0.002  0.000 
Prob. of executing guarantee (%)  34.290 32.892  15.434  29.650    34.068 28.925 
Averages              
  consumption  5.362  5.365 5.360  5.361    5.362  5.362 
  equity price  2.198  2.199 2.198  2.208    2.198  2.206 
  equity holdings  0.844  0.844  0.844  0.842    0.844  0.842 
  expected PDV of excess prices            0.012  0.013  0.011  0.022   0.015  0.023 
Standard deviations (%)              
  consumption  2.052  2.269 2.615  2.014    2.047  2.191 
  current account-GDP ratio  1.487  1.473 2.035  1.567    1.490  1.584 
  equity price  0.099  0.149 0.104  0.091    0.100  0.429 
  expected PDV of excess prices            2.083  3.913  4.235  1.375   1.368  1.466 
 
               
Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis (Continued) 
  Baseline   Productivity Shocks   Guarantees     Trading Costs 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)    (V)  (VI) 
   ρ  = 0.8  σ ε   = 2.4%  1%  above  q
f   θ  = 0.01 a = 2 
Domestic welfare loss1/              
  high leverage state  -1.036  -1.137 -1.033  -2.359   -1.025  1.506 
  long-run average  0.062  0.063 0.132  0.086    0.286  0.332 
Change in PDV of traders' returns1/              
  high leverage state  -0.670  -0.732 -0.660  -1.372   2.501  -0.459 
  long-run average  52.621  51.867 17.567  54.696   122.862 116.646
              
III.  SCG Economy 
Initial responses in high leverage state              
  consumption  -0.952  -0.878  -0.988 -0.626    -0.920  -2.182 
  current account-GDP ratio 0.670  0.618  0.702  0.440    0.648  1.538 
  equity price  0.107  0.270  0.105  0.550    0.313  -3.227 
  traders' returns  -4.555  -4.560 -4.555  -4.586   -4.558  -4.928 
Moments of the ergodic distribution              
Prob. of binding mar. cons. (%)  0.001 0.014  0.042  0.009    0.013  0.000 
Prob. of executing guarantee (%)  0.035 0.261  0.391  0.502    6.063  3.245 
Averages              
  consumption  5.364  5.369 5.363  5.363    5.358  5.355 
  equity price  2.188  2.188 2.189  2.190    2.190  2.191 
  equity holdings  0.855  0.855 0.855  0.850    0.879  0.874 
  expected PDV of excess prices            0.002 0.002  0.011  0.003    0.007  0.009 
Standard deviations (%)              
  consumption  2.121  2.317 2.709  2.095    2.061  2.298 
  current account-GDP ratio  1.380  1.369 2.028  1.420    1.466  1.536 
  equity price  0.121  0.187 0.120  0.137    0.154  0.469 
 expected PDV of excess prices             42.186 62.894  4.235  52.202    37.543 51.111 
Domestic welfare loss1/              
  high leverage state  -0.317  -0.481 -0.297  -0.869   -0.385  2.596 
  long-run average  0.057  0.053 0.033  0.054    0.086  0.121 
Change in PDV of traders' returns1/              
  high leverage state  -0.276  -0.359 -0.246  -0.567   2.985 0.167 
  long-run average  42.460  41.196 9.446  47.217    72.049 73.680 
                           
Note: The guaranteed price is 0.5 percent (1 percent for column (IV)) above the fundamentals price in the 
low productivity state of the baseline simulation. Welfare costs are compensating variations in initial 
consumption that equalize lifetime utility in each simulation with that of the corresponding NFE. Initial 
responses are in percent of the corresponding NFE and detrended as described in the text (except the 
response for traders' returns which is in percent of the capital stock and the response for the current 
account-output ratio which is the difference in percentage points relative to the corresponding NFE). 
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 Figure 3. Consumption Impact Effects of a Negative Productivity Shock in the Sudden Stop Region of Equity & Bonds  

















Figure 4. Current Account-GDP Ratio Impact Effects of a Negative Productivity Shock in the Sudden Stop Region of Equity & Bonds 
(percentage points difference from long run average) 
 
 
a. Nearly Frictionless Economy 
 
 
b. Economy with Binding Margin Requirements 
 
 Figure 5. Equity Price Impact Effects of a Negative Productivity Shock in the Sudden Stop Region of Equity & Bonds 




a. Nearly Frictionless Economy 
 
 
b. Economy with Binding Margin Requirements 
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current account-GDP ratio
High Leverage State1/ Low Leverage State2/
 
1/ Forecasting functions of each variable’s equilibrium Markov process conditional on initial states α =0.938 
and b=-4.68, which imply a leverage ratio of 0.029 and a debt/GDP ratio of 0.597. 
2/ Forecasting functions of each variable’s equilibrium Markov process conditional on initial states α =0.938 
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 Figure 8. Equity Pricing Function in the Low Productivity State 
 
 
a. Economy with Binding Margin Requirements 
 
 




c. Economy with State-Contingent Guarantees 